SOMALI UNITY: Enforced or Earned? Part I

The foundation of enforced unity is force. The foundation of earned unity is mutual consent. Thus, from these two irreconcilable foundations, spring all flavours of unity (or in many occurrences disunity) – may that be between adult consenting individuals, or in our case, between communities of peoples. Between the two types of unity, the former is unnatural and subject to eventual breakdown. The latter, however, is naturally harmonic and subject to durability. Such being the nature of these types of unity, the wisest recommendation to all those who seek it or have dire need for it, is to rightly endeavour for the procurement of consent. They should keep in mind that dissent, however little it appears in the beginning, has the tendency to gather momentum at some unexpected time. The aspirations of the people need careful treatment.

In instances where care and attention is not paid to the feelings and aspirations of others (even if the others concerned are in a vulnerable position), forceful imposition of unity upon them, eventually gives them the dedication and the determination they need, to rebel in favour of independence. In many cases, throughout the world’s history, communities and societies have been subjected to enforced unity. Although this unity has been maintained for many years afterwards through brutal force, this forceful policy has not been successful in stopping oppressed communities, and societies, in their struggle to regain the right to be in control of their own affairs.

 Thus, the irrepressible natural urge in humans to regain their freedom, should deter far-sighted leaders of nation-states from the promotion of enforced unity. The promotion of such a project will become, predictably, a failure. At times, an initially ‘earned’ unity may, due to unexpected ill-treatment, become a legally enforced unity. In Somalia’s case, there has been an earned unity that has been achieved after the independence of two regions of country, which afterwards, went under metamorphosis that gave birth to what I will call ‘enforced unity’. As such, the nature and implications of these two types of unity is the subject of this writing. In the end, one would hope to elaborate on the complexities and controversies, especially legacies left behind by the union of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.

 In the complex and controversial of Somali unity, and the concept of Greater Somalia, there were always legal, territorial and moral questions that would raise their head. Chief among these questions is thus: while disregarding practical obstacles on the ground, is the current pursuit of unity or disunity by our peoples morally justified, legally binding and territorially an absolute necessity? To provide a satisfactory answer to this question, it is absolutely crucial to critically and objectively: (A) evaluate and analyse the inherent morality; (B) the legality; and (C) the territorial implications of unity or disunity (or secession). My view is that only when we have fully considered these three criteria, can the informed answer to our question become available. In many previous discussions or political debates, some social and political commentators, have in their analysis only chosen to make use of one or two of the three criteria, and as a result came to conclusions that suffer from simplicity and narrow-mindedness. To treat this question with its deserved seriousness and importance, I will approach it with an open mind and critical evaluations of all three criteria.

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(A) – What is the morality of Somali Unity or disunity?

An insistence on the stipulation that Somali unity is sacrosanct and morally justified is, obviously, a very attractive stand-point. Likewise, anyone who advocates for the unnecessary disunity, of the Somali nation, would have him/her efforts culminating in a predicament that is tantamount to the creation of an irresponsible and dangerous social condition of cultural and economic balkanization. That stated, however, sometimes what is circumstantially probable, would dictate us to consider both what is favourable and the unfavourable of unity and disunity in the most calm and rational manner. The unity that our nation has achieved, unparalleled in all of the African, was the culmination of a favourable social condition in which our peoples aspired for reunification in their most sincere desire. Enforced colonial disunity has conditioned our peoples to harbour such strong desires of yearning for unity with their brethrens. Like forcefully separated lovers, our peoples ran as faster as they could to the embrace of each other, without much forethought in ways of turning desire to an everlasting and harmonic symbiosis.

 During the ten years that led up to the nation’s independence, which was marked by the Trusteeship decade, a process of preparation and institutions building has been initiated in the South of the country. The Italian colonial power responsible for this project has, to some extent helped put in place a rudimentary structure and system of governance modelled on theirs. In general, there was a ten year period to achieve the pre-requisites necessary for an independent state, to gain its independence and thereon effectively govern its country. The Italian attempt of preparedness, or shoddy institution-building, wasn’t at its best, but at least the basic state apparatus was put in place.

 However, in the North of the country under British rule, the project of preparedness and institution building, was unfortunately not up to scratch, as the entire project was only realized after the northerners demanded independence, in their anticipation to coincide their freedom with the date the southerners were to gain independence, which was by then few years away. The British, unlike the Italians in the South, have neglected to prepare the North for independence. It was only in the last years prior to Southern independence that the British hurried to prepare the North for independence. So, by the time of their independence and unity was sought, the Northerners were simply in much technical disadvantage to the South. Thus, this was to become the first weakness of those hailing from the Northern regions, making unity an institutional disadvantage.

 In their yearning and later euphoria for unity, initially, an unconditional unity of both parts of country was the Northerner’s dream, and to form a greater Somali nation. However when that dream became and materialized into reality, there was fair share of practical problems. The Northerners were at last one with the Southerners, and the nation was born. But the problem was that they and the Southerners were now like two lovers who have longed for each other, and upon meeting realized that they both spoke two difference languages. In addition, their long absence from each other, revealed upon proximity differences that were unknown previously. And thus, after a while, the lovers became estranged and suspicious.

 This is what has happened. Here was Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, both recognizing each other as Somalis, but equipped with two different colonial approaches or attitudes to administrative and governing practices. Each side was suspicious of the suitability and effectiveness of other’s approach to rule the country. The country, therefore, found itself in a condition where there was one constitution and one parliament, which is adhered to by subjects practising two incompatible approaches.

 For sometime, the then government was forced to legalize the two approaches in regions they were relevant to, and such application was done through a handful of hard to find interpreters who spoke both English and Italian. Still, however, considering the level of preparedness of the South and its higher population, the Italian approach started gaining prominence. Not to mention, it was in Mogadishu, that was the headquarters of the government. Hargeysa, which was the base of British Somaliland, proved, to some extent, to have become politically reduced in significance, and remote due to poor communication and infrastructure. This was to become the second political weakness befalling the Northerners.

 Also related was that while the majority inhabitants of British Somaliland were the majority rule there, shortly after the union with the South, they came to play a role much less significant in national politics. Even when they formed a coalition with minority clans from the North in order to create a single effective political block, the desired result could not be achieved. Their share in politics, economics and employment opportunities, were not also satisfactory. For example, the level of pay civil servants received in the North was lower than those of the South. Such disparity has precipitated protests and strikes in the North, which later attracted the government’s attention and has led to some changes. Although the government made some changes, the persistence of this disparity became the third factor that disadvantaged the Northerners.

 By mentioning these three factors, amongst many, it is reasonable to suggest that the practical problems associated with the beautiful Somali dream, eventually sowed the seeds of future discontent among Somalis. There is no point blaming our founding fathers for their failure to overcome these practical problems, because at the time, limitations in their administrative and governing knowledge had handicapped them. Although they have tried their best, this limitation in knowledge and expertise was the legacy left behind by the colonial powers, but that doesn’t also mean that there was no corruption and mismanagement in the Somali government.

 All in all, these were the factors that disadvantaged the northerners after their union with the Southerners. They had no conditions on the unity but were completely motivated by patriotic sentiments. Although highly praise worthy, it can be said, that the Northerners’ patriotism has neglected their rightful pursuit of their interests. Their basis for unity should have been the advancement of their interests. In unity, they found their interest worse off than in disunity, and from that complacency, a good question that begs asking is: does the pursuit of advancing one’s interests accord a moral justification to unity or disunity? More specifically, if unity is not interest-dependent, what other moral justification does it depend on? Can the interest of a people be totally disregarded for the preservation of unity what come may?

 It is fair to argue that all types of agreements are subject to the pursuit of one’s interests. If one advances own interests without infringing on the interests of others, then it is safe to argue that one is endowed with the moral justification to seek his own happiness, regardless of what unity means or doesn’t mean. And applying this logic to the interests represented by the leaders of the North; currently aren’t they morally justified to engage in activities towards that end? As rationality prescribes, everyone has the moral right to seek that which he/she considers to be contributing to overall their happiness. Such being the case, I believe, the decision of the northerners to secede cannot be claimed to be morally unjustified.

 Instead of denying them this moral right, the right cause would have been to admit that their grievances were valid, and the regrettable wrongs done to them, would be addressed. The next action would have been to overturn all previous institutional disadvantages, and bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes committed against them. To further remedy the situation, a scheme of sincere negotiations and reconciliation should have been commenced, with the desirable effect of forgiveness from the peoples of the North. Of course, reconciliatory efforts such as these could have been hoped to avert the disunity of the country, but unfortunately, this has not been attempted and many are still in denial what took place. As many pro-Greater Somalia proponents argue, whatever grievances Northerners might have had, such grievances alone do not qualify them for secession from Somalia. Legally, they claim, the 1960 Pact of Union between the North and South of Somalia is still binding. Thus, the Northerners were not and are not justified to declare independence. This legal aspect of the union is dealt with below.

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Part II coming soon, Inshallah.

Ali A. Isseh

ali.isseh@gmail.com